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 Abstract.  We derive a model for consumer loan default and credit card expenditure.  The 
default model is based on statistical models for discrete choice, in contrast to the usual procedure of 
linear discriminant analysis.  The model is then extended to incorporate the default probability in a 
model of expected profit.  The technique is applied to a large sample of applications and expenditure 
from a major credit card company.  The nature of the data mandates the use of models of sample 
selection for estimation.  The empirical model for expected profit produces an optimal acceptance 
rate for card applications which is far higher than the observed rate used by the credit card vendor 
based on the discriminant analysis. 
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 A Statistical Model for Credit Scoring 
1.  Introduction 
 Prediction of loan default has an obvious practical utility.  Indeed, the identification of 
default risk appears to be of paramount interest to issuers of credit cards.  In this study, we will argue 
that default risk is overemphasized in the assessment of credit card applications.  In an empirical 
application, we find that a model that incorporates the expected profit from issuance of a credit card 
in the approval decision leads to a substantially higher acceptance rate than is present in the 
observed data and, by implication, acceptance of a greater average level of default risk. 
 A major credit card vendor must evaluate tens or even hundreds of thousands of credit card 
applications each year.  These obviously cannot all be subjected to the scrutiny of a loan committee 
in the way that, say, a real estate loan might.  Thus, statistical methods and automated procedures are 
essential.  Banks and credit card issuers typically use `credit scoring models.'  In principle, the credit 
score could incorporate any amount of relevant business information.  In practice, credit scoring for 
credit card applications appears to be focused fairly narrowly on default risk and on a rather small 
set of attributes.1  This study will develop an integrated statistical model for evaluating a credit card 
application which incorporates both default risk and the anticipated profit from the loan in the 
calculation.  The model is then estimated using a large sample of applications and followup 
expenditure and default data for a major credit card company.  The models are based on standard 
techniques for discrete choice and linear regression, but the data present two serious complications.  
First, observed data on default and expenditure used to fit the predictive models are subjected to a 
form of censoring that mandates the use of models of sample selection.  Second, our sample used to 
analyze the approval decision is systematically different from the population from which it was 
drawn.  This nonrepresentative nature of the data is remedied through the use of choice based 
sampling corrections. 
 
     1We say `appears to be' because the actual procedures used by credit scoring agencies are not public information nor, 
in fact, are they even necessarily known by the banks that use them.  The small amount of information that we have was 
provided to us in conversation by the supporters of this study.  We will return to this issue below. 
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 Boyes, et. al. (1989) examined credit card applications and account performance using data 
similar to ours and a model that, with minor reinterpretation, is the same as one of the components of 
our model.  They and we reach several similar conclusions.  However, in one of the central issues in 
this study, we differ sharply.  Since the studies are so closely related, we will compare their findings 
to ours at several points. 
 The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 will present models which have been used or 
proposed for assessing probabilities of loan default.  Section 3 will describe an extension of the 
model.  Here, we will suggest a framework for using the loan default equation in a model of cost and 
projected revenue to predict the profit or loss from the decision to accept a credit card application.  
The full model is sketched here and completed in Section 5.  Sections 4 and 5 will present an 
application of the technique.  The data and some statistical procedures for handling its distinctive 
characteristics are presented in Section 4.  The empirical results are given in Section 5.  Conclusions 
are drawn in Section 6. 
2.  Models for Prediction of Default 
 Individual i, with vector of attributes xi, applies for a loan at time 0.  The attributes include 
such items as: personal characteristics including age, sex, number of dependents, and education; 
economic attributes such as income, employment status and home ownership; a credit history 
including the number of previous defaults, and so on.  Let the random variable yi indicate whether 
individual i has defaulted on a loan (yi=1) or has not (yi=0) during the time which has elapsed from 
the application until yi is is observed.  We consider two familiar frameworks for predicting default.  
The technique of discriminant analysis is considered first.  We will not make use of this technique in 
this study.  But, one of the observed outcome variables in the data that we will examine, the approval 
decision, was generated by the use of this technique.  So it useful to enumerate its characteristics.  
We then consider a probit model for discrete choice as an alternative. 
2.1.  Linear Discriminant Analysis 
 The technique of discriminant analysis rests on the assumption that there are two populations 
of individuals, which we denote `1' and `0,' each characterized by a multivariate normal distribution 
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of the attributes, x.  An individual with attribute vector xi, is drawn from one of the two populations, 
and it is needed to determine which.  The analysis is carried out by assigning to the application a `Z' 
score, computed as 
     Zi  =  b0  +  bxi. (2.1) 
Given a sample of previous observations on yi and xi, the vector of weights, b = (b0,b1), can be 
obtained as a multiple of the vector of regression coefficients in the linear regression of di = P0yi - 
P1(1-yi) on a constant and the set of attributes, where P1 is the proportion of 1s in the sample and 
P0 = 1-P1.  The scale factor is (n-2)/e′e from the linear regression.2  The individual is classified in 
group 1 if their `Z' score is greater than Z (usually 0) and 0 otherwise.3  The linearity (and simplicity) 
of the computation is a compelling virtue. 
 The assumption of multivariate normality is often held up as the most serious shortcoming of 
this technique.4  This seems exaggerated.  Techniques which rely on normality are often surprisingly 
robust to violations of the assumption, recent discussion notwithstanding.5  The superiority of the 
discrete choice techniques discussed in the next section, which are arguably more appropriate for 
this exercise, is typically fairly modest.6  Since the left hand side variable in the aforementioned 
linear regression is a linear function of yi, di = yi - P1, the calculated
 7 discriminant function can be 
construed as nothing more (or less) than a linear probability model.8  As such, the comparison 
between discriminant analysis and, say, the probit model could be reduced to one between the linear 
 
     2See Maddala (1983, pp. 18-25). 
     3We forego full details on the technique since we shall not be applying it to our data nor will we be comparing it to 
the other methods to be described. 
     4See Press and Wilson (1978), for example. 
     5See Greene (1983), Goldberger (1983), and Manski (1989).   
     6See, for example, Press and Wilson (1978). 
     7We emphasize `calculated' because there is no underlying counterpart to the probability model in the discriminant 
function. 
     8For a detailed and very readable discussion, see Dhrymes (1974, pp. 67-77). 
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probability model and the probit or logit model.9  Thus, it is no surprise that the differences between 
them are not great; this has been observed elsewhere.10
 Its long track record notwithstanding, one could argue that the underpinning of discriminant 
analysis is naive.  The technique divides the universe of loan applicants into two types, those who 
will default and those who will not.  The crux of the analysis is that at the time of application, the 
individual is as if preordained to be a defaulter or a nondefaulter.  In point of fact, the same 
individual might be in either group at any time, depending on a host of attendant circumstances and 
random elements in their own behavior.  Thus, prediction of default is not a problem of classification 
the same way as is, say, determining the sex of prehistoric individuals from a fossilized record. 
2.2  Discrete Choice Models 
 Index function based models of discrete choice, such as the probit and logit models, assume 
that for any individual, given a set of attributes, there is a definable probability that they will actually 
default on a loan.  This interpretation places all individuals in a single population.  The observed 
outcome, default/no default, arises from the characteristics and random behavior of the individuals.  
Ex ante, all that can be produced by the model is a probability.  The observation of yi ex post is the 
outcome of a single Bernoulli trial. 
 This alternative formulation does not assume that individual attributes, xi, are necessarily 
normally distributed.  The probability of default arises conditionally on these attributes and is a 
function of the inherent randomness of events and human behavior and the unmeasured and 
unmeasurable determinants which are not specifically included in the model.11  The core of this 
formulation is an index function model with a latent regression, 
    D =  β′xi  +  εi. (2.2) 
The dependent variable might be identified with the `propensity to default.'  In the present context, 
 
     9See Press and Wilson (1976) for discussion. 
     10See Aldrich and Nelson (1984) or Amemiya (1985), for example. 
     11Our discussion of this modelling framework will also be brief.  Greater detail may be found in Greene (1993, 
chapter 21). 
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an intuitively appealing interpretation of D* is as a quantitative measure of `how much trouble the 
individual is in.'  Conditioning variables, xi, might include, income, credit history, the ratio of credit 
card burden to current income, and so on.  If D is sufficiently large relative to the attributes, that is, if 
the individual is in trouble enough, they default.  Formally,
   D
so the probability of interest is 
     Pi  =  Prob[Di = 1│xi]. (2.4) 
Assuming that ε is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1, we obtain the default 
probability 
  Prob[Di = 1│xi] =  Prob[D > 0│xi] 
         =  Prob[εi ≤ β′xi│xi] (2.5) 
         =  Φ(β′xi), 
where Φ(⋅) is the standard normal CDF.12  The classification rule is 
    Predict Di  =  1  if  Φ(β′xi)  >  P*, (2.6) 
where P* is a threshold value chosen by the analyst.  The value 0.5 is usually used for P* under the 
reasoning that we should predict default if the model predicts that it is more likely than not.  For our 
purposes, this turns out to be an especially poor predictor.  Indeed, in applications such as this one, 
with unbalanced data sets (that is, with a small proportion of ones or zeros for the dependent 
variable) this familiar rule may fail to perform as well as the naive rule `always (or never) predict D 
= 1.'13  We will return to the issue in detail below, since it is crucial in our analysis.  The vector of 
marginal effects in the model is 
    ∂Prob[Di = 1│xi] 
   θ  = ──────── =  φ(β′xi)β, (2.7) 
     ∂xi 
 
                                                 
     12One might question the normality assumption.  But, the logistic and alternative distributions rarely bring any 
differences in the predictions of the model.  For our data, these two models produced virtually identical results at the 
first stage.  However, only the probit form is tractable in the integrated model. 
     13For discussion, see Amemiya (1981). 
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where φ(⋅) is the standard normal density.14  If the discriminant score function can be viewed as a 
`model' (rather than as merely the solution to an optimization problem), the coefficients bk would be 
the counterparts.  The usefulness of θ is in determining which particular factors would contribute 
most to a rejection of a credit application.  An example is given in Section 5.7. 
2.3.  Censoring in the Default Data 
 Regardless of how the default model is formulated, in practice, it must be constructed using 
data on loan recipients.  But, the model is to be applied to a broader population, some (possibly even 
most) of whom are applicants who will ultimately be rejected.  The underlying logic of the credit 
scoring problem is to ascertain how much an applicant resembles individuals who have defaulted in 
the past.  The problem with this approach is that mere resemblance to past defaulters may give a 
misleading indication of the individual default probability for an individual who has not already 
been screened. 
 The model is to be used to assign a default probability to a random individual who applies 
for a loan, but the only information that exists about default probabilities comes from previous loan 
recipients.  The relevant question for this analysis is whether, in the population at large, 
Prob[D=1│x] equals Prob[D=1│x and C=1] in the subpopulation, where `C = 1' denotes having 
received the loan, or, in our case, `card recipient.'  Since loan recipients have passed a prior screen 
based, one would assume, on an assessment of default probability, Prob[D=1│x] must exceed 
Prob[D=1│x,C=1] for the same x.  For a given set of attributes, x, individuals in the group with C = 
1 are, by nature of the prior selection, less likely to default than otherwise similar individuals chosen 
randomly from a population that is a mixture of individuals who will have C = 0 and C = 1.  Thus, 
the unconditional model will give a downward biased estimate of the default probability for an 
individual selected at random from the full population.  This describes a form of censoring.  To be 
applicable to the population at large, the estimated default model should condition specifically on 
cardholder status. 
 
     14While the coefficients in logit and probit models often differ markedly, estimates of θ in the two models tend to be 
similar, indeed, often nearly identical.  [See Greene (1993) and Davidson and Mackinnon (1993, Chapter 15).] 
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 We will use a bivariate probit specification to model this.  The structural equations are  
 
 Default equation:  D  =  β'xi  +  εi (2.8) 
     Di  =  1  if and only if D > 0, and 0 else. 
 Cardholder equation: C  =  γ'vi  +  wi (2.9) 
     Ci  =  1  if and only if C > 0, and 0 else. 
 Sampling rule:  Di and xi are only observed if Ci = 1 (2.10) 
     Ci and vi are observed for all applicants. 
 Selectivity:   [εi,wi] ~ N2[0,0,1,1,ρεw] (2.11) 
The vector of attributes, vi, are the factors used in the approval decision.  The probability of interest 
is the probability of default given that a loan application is accepted, which is
 
 
       Φ2[β′xi,γ′vi,ρ] 
   Prob[Di=1│Ci=1]   =  ──────, (2.12) 
         Φ[γ′vi] 
 
where Φ2 is the bivariate normal cumulative probability.  If ρ equals 0, the selection is of no 
consequence, and the unconditional model described earlier is appropriate. 
The counterparts to the marginal effects noted earlier are
 
 
    ∂Φ2(β′xi,γ′vi,ρ)/Φ(γ′vi) 
    ──────────    =  θ│Ci=1. (2.13) 
                ∂xi 
 
The detailed expression for this derivative is given in Section 5.  This model was developed by 
Wynand and Bernard (1981) and recently applied to an analysis of consumer loans by Boyes, et. al. 
(1989).15
 
     15Boyes, et. al. treated the joint determination of cardholder status and default as a model of partial observability in 
the sense of Poirier (1980).  Since cardholder status is generated by the credit scorer while the default indicator is 
generated later by the cardholder the observations are sequential, not simultaneous.  As such, the model of Abowd and 
Farber (1982) might apply.  But, the simpler censoring interpretation seems more appropriate.  It turns out that the 
difference is only one of interpretation.  The log likelihood functions for Boyes et. al.'s model (see their page 6) and 
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3.  A Model for Evaluating an Application 
 Expenditure of a credit card recipient might be described by a linear regression model: 
     Si  =  α′zi  +  ui. (3.1) 
Expenditure data are drawn conditionally on Ci=1.  Thus, with the cardholder data, we are able to 
estimate only 
    E[Si│zi,Ci=1]  =  α′zi  +  E[ui│Ci=1,zi]. (3.2) 
This may or may not differ systematically from 
     E[Si│zi]  =  α′zi. (3.3) 
The statistical question is whether the sample selection into cardholder status is significantly related 
to the expenditure level of the individuals sampled.  The equations of the sample selection model 
[see Heckman (1979)] used here are 
 
 Expenditure  Si  =  α'zi  +  ui. (3.4) 
 Cardholder Status C  =  γ'vi  +  wi (3.5) 
    Ci  =  1  if and only if C  >  0, and 0 otherwise. 
 Sample Selectivity [ui,wi] ~ N2[0,0,σ,1,ρuwσu]. (3.6) 
 Selectivity Corrected Regression 
   E[Si│Ci=1] =  α′zi  +  E[ui│Ci=1] 
                =  α′zi  +  (-ρuwσu)λi (3.7) 
                =  α′zi  +  αλλi, 
where               λi    =  φ(γ′vi) / Φ(γ′vi). 
Estimation techniques are discussed in Section 5. 
 Finally, it seems likely that even controlling for other factors, the probability of default is 
related to expenditures.  The extension to (2.12) that we will examine is 
        _ 
         _    Φ2[β'xi + δSi, γ'vi, ρ] 
 
ours [see (5.1)] are the same. 
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  Prob[Di = 1│Ci=1,xi,Si]  =  ────────── (3.8) 
    
_
         Φ(γ'vi) 
where
    Si  =  E[Si│Ci=1]. 
 
 Expenditure, like the default probability, is only an intermediate step.  Ultimately, the 
expected profitability of a decision to accept a loan application is a function of the default 
probability, the expected expenditure, and the costs associated with administering the loan.  Let 
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   PD  =  Prob[Di=1│Ci=1]. 
Then
    E[Π(xi,vi,zi)│Ci=1]  =  E[Si│Ci=1]m   (merchant fee) 
            +  E[Si│Ci=1](1 - PD)(f-t) (finance charge - t bill rate) 
            -    E[Si│Ci=1]PD[1 - r(1 + q)] (losses from default) 
            +  fixed fees paid by cardholder 
            -   overhead expenses for the account. 
(3.9)
 
The merchant fee, m, is collected whether or not the consumer defaults on their loan.  This term 
would also include any float which is accrued before the merchant is reimbursed.  The second term 
gives the finance charges from the consumer, which are received only if default does not occur.  The 
third term includes the direct loss of the defaulted loan minus any ultimate recovery.  The term 
denoted `r' is the recovery rate and 'q' is the penalty assessed on recovered funds. 
 This is a simple model which involves spending, costs, and the default probability.  
Obviously, there are elements missing.  Finance charges paid by the cardholder are the most 
complicated element.  Specific treatment would requires a subsidiary model of timing of repayment 
and how the consumer would manage a revolving charge account.16  For the present, we assume that 
the finance charge component, if any, is simply included in the term `f' in (3.9).  Variations of this 
value could be used to model different repayment schedules.  The model estimated later is for a 
monthly expenditure, so the applicable figure could range from 0 to 1.5 percent depending on what 
is assumed about the repayment schedule.  The figure is then net of the opportunity cost of the funds, 
based, for example, on the return on a treasury bill.  Admittedly, the model is crude.  It is important 
to emphasize that the preceding model applies to purchases, not to revolving loans.  That is, the 
consumer might well make their purchases, then take years to repay the loan, each month making a 
minimum payment.  The preceding is much simpler than that; it is a single period model which 
assumes that all transactions occur, either full repayment or default, within the one year period of 
 
     16Of course, if the finance charges, themselves, were influential in the default rate, this would also have to be 
considered.  This seems unlikely, but either way, this complication is beyond the scope of this study.  Our data contain 
no information about finance charges incurred or paid.  We have only the expenditure levels and the default indicator. 
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observation.  Nonetheless, even in this simple formulation, a clear pattern emerges.  Based on 
observed data and the description of the cost structure, consideration of the censoring problem and 
use of an integrated model produce a prescription for considerably higher acceptance rates for loan 
applicants than are seen in our observed data. 
4.  Data Used in the Application 
 The models described earlier were estimated for a well known credit card company.  The 
data set used in estimation consisted of 13,444 observations on credit card applications received in a 
single month in 1988.   The observation for an individual consists of the application data, data from a 
credit reporting agency, market descriptive data for the 5 digit zip code in which the individual 
resides, and, for those applications that were accepted, a twelve month history of expenditures and a 
default indicator for the twelve month period following initial acceptance of the application.  Default 
is defined as having skipped payment for six months.  A full summary of the data appears in Tables 
1 and 2. 
  
 
 13
Table 1.  Variables Used in Analysis of Credit Card Default 
─────────────────────────────────────────────── 
 
Indicators
 
 CARDHLDR   =  1 for cardholders, 0 for denied applicants. 
 DEFAULT    =  1 for defaulted on payment, 0 if not. 
 
Expenditure
 
 EXP1, EXP2, EXP3, ..., EXP12 = monthly expenditure in most recent 12 months. 
 
Demographic and Socioeconomic, from Application
 
 AGE       = age in years and twelfths of a year. 
 DEPNDNTS  = dependents, missing data converted to 1. 
 OWNRENT   = indicator = 1 if own home, 0 if rent. 
 MTHPRVAD  = months at previous address. 
 PREVIOUS = 1 if previous card holder. 
 ADDLINC  = additional income, missing data coded as 0. 
 INCOME  = primary income. 
 SELFEMPL  = 1 if self employed, 0 otherwise. 
 PROF     = 1 for professional (airline, entertainer, other, sales, tech). 
 UNEMP     = 1 for unemployed, alimony, disabled, or other. 
 MGT     = 1 for management services and other management. 
 MILITARY  = 1 for noncommissioned and other. 
 CLERICAL  = 1 for clerical staff. 
 SALES    = 1 for sales staff. 
 OTHERJOB = 1 for all other categories including teachers, railroad, retired, repair workers, 
    students, engineers, dress makers, food handlers, etc. 
 
Constructed Variables
 
 INCOME        = income+aadlinc. 
 AVGEXP    = (1/12)ΣiEXPi. 
 INCPER = income per family member = (income+additional income)/(1+dependents). 
 EXP_INC    = average expenditure for 12 months/average monthly income. 
 
Miscellaneous Application Data
 
 MTHCURAD  = months at current address. 
 CRDBRINQ  = number of credit bureau inquiries. 
 CREDMAJR   = 1 if first credit card indicated on application is a major credit card. 
 CREDDEPT  = 1 if first credit card indicated is a department store card. 
 CREDGAS = 1 if first credit card indicated is a gasoline company. 
 CURTRADE = number of current trade item accounts (existing charge acounts). 
 MTHMPLOY  = months employed. 
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Table 1.  (Continued) 
──────────────────────────────────────────────── 
 
Types of Bank Accounts
 
 BANKSAV = 1 if only savings account, 0 otherwise. 
 BANKCH = 1 if only checking account, 0 else. 
 BANKBOTH   = 1 if both savings and checking, 0 else. 
 
Derogatories and Other Credit Data
 
 MAJORDRG  = count of major derogatory reports (long delinquincies) from credit bureau. 
 MINORDRG  = count of minor derogatories from credit bureau. 
 TRADACCT = number of open, active trade lines. 
 
Credit Bureau Data
 
 CREDOPEN = number of open and current trade accounts. 
 CREDACTV = number of active trade lines. 
 CRDDEL30 = number of trade lines 30 days past due at the time of the report. 
 CR30DLNQ = number of 30 day delinquencies within 12 months. 
 AVGRVBAL = dollar amount of average revolving balance. 
 AVBALINC = average revolving balance divided by average monthly income. 
 
Market Data
 
 BUYPOWER = buying power index. 
 PCTCOLL       = percent college graduates in 5 digit zip code. 
 MEDAGE = median age in 5 digit zip code. 
 MEDINC  = median income in 5 digit zip code. 
 PCTOWN = percent who own their own home. 
 PCTBLACK = percent black. 
 PCTSPAN = percent spanish. 
 GROWTH = population growth rate. 
 PCTEMPL = 1987 employment percent. 
 
Commerce Within 5 Digit Zip Code
 
 APPAREL  = apparel stores percent of retail sales in 5 digit zip code of residence. 
 AUTO  = auto dealer stores, percent. 
 BUILDMTL = building material stores, percent. 
 DEPTSTOR = department stores, percent. 
 DRUGSTOR = drug stores, percent. 
 EATDRINK = eating and drinking establishments, percent. 
 FURN  = furniture stores, percent. 
 GAS  = gas stations, percent. 
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Table 2  Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Variable    Mean    Std. Dev.  Minimum   Maximum    Cases 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
CARDHLDR  .78094       .41362     0.0      1.000    13444 
DEFAULT   .094866      .29304     0.0      1.000    10499 
DB1       268.26       542.39     0.0      24650    10499 
DB2       252.60       537.20     0.0      24030    10499 
DB3       238.89       460.30     0.0       7965    10499 
DB4       247.32       507.61     0.0      14240    10499 
DB5       253.24       504.53     0.0      17870    10499 
DB6       266.46       509.99     0.0      10310    10499 
DB7       256.41       500.52     0.0       9772    10499 
DB8       248.62       494.10     0.0       9390    10499 
DB9       245.06       472.36     0.0       8377    10499 
DB10      228.60       441.28     0.0       6926    10499 
DB11      273.66       520.60     0.0      16820    10499 
DB12      233.26       458.15     0.0      18970    10499 
ADDLINC1   .41262       .91279     0.0     10.000    13444 
BANKSAV   .033695      .18045     0.0      1.000    13444 
BANKCH    .29753       .45719     0.0      1.000    13444 
BANKBOTH  .66877       .47067     0.0      1.000    13444 
AGE       33.472       10.226     0.0      88.67    13444 
MTHCURAD  55.319       63.090     0.0      576.0    13444 
CRDBRINQ  1.4080       2.2891     0.0      56.00    13444 
CREDMAJR  .81308       .38986     0.0      1.000    13444 
DEPNDNTS  1.0173       1.2791     0.0      9.000    13444 
MTHMPLOY  60.648       72.240     0.0      600.0    13444 
PROF      .11537       .31948     0.0      1.000    13444 
UNEMP     .00052068    .022813    0.0      1.000    13444 
MGT       .074308      .26228     0.0      1.000    13444 
MILITARY  .022464      .14819     0.0      1.000    13444 
CLERICAL  .088143      .28351     0.0      1.000    13444 
SALES     .078325      .26869     0.0      1.000    13444 
OTHERJOB  .62087       .48519     0.0      1.000    13444 
MAJORDRG  .46281       1.4327     0.0      22.00    13444 
MINORDRG  .29054       .76762     0.0      11.00    13444 
OWNRENT   .45597       .49808     0.0      1.000    13444 
MTHPRVAD  81.285       80.359     0.0      600.0    13444 
PREVIOUS  .073341      .26071     0.0      1.000    13444 
INCOME1    3.4241       1.7775     0.1300   20.00    13444 
SELFEMPL .057944       .23365     0.0      1.000    13444 
TRADACCT  6.4220       6.1069     0.0      50.00    13444 
INCPER1    2.1720       1.3591     0.03625  15.00    13444 
EXP_INC  .070974       .10392     0.00009  2.038    13444 
CREDOPEN  6.0552       5.2405     0.0      43.00    13444 
CREDACTV  2.2722       2.6137     0.0      27.00    13444 
CRDDEL30 .055564       .26153     0.0      3.000    13444 
CR30DLNQ  .36581       1.2494     0.0      21.00    13444 
AVGRVBAL  5.2805       7.5904     0.0      190.0    13444 
AVBALINC  46.570       42.728     0.0      2523.    13444 
BUYPOWER .013963      .0090948    0.0      .1134    13444 
PCTCOLL   10.729       8.5104     0.0      54.90    13444 
MEDAGE    33.181       5.4232     0.0      65.00    13444 
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MEDINC1    2.8341       1.0437     0.0      7.500    13444 
PCTOWN    53.983       28.549     0.0      100.0    13444 
PCTBLACK  11.777       20.557     0.0      100.0    13444 
PCTSPAN   7.7817       13.186     0.0      96.60    13444 
GROWTH2    .0022462    .001877    -0.06172  .7068    13444 
PCTEMPL   40.993       108.01     0.0      5126.    13444 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Variable    Mean    Std. Dev.   Minimum   Maximum    Cases 
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
APPAREL   2.4398       2.4312     0.0      33.30     13444 
AUTO      1.4972       1.3235     0.0      33.30     13444 
BUILDMTL  1.1293       1.2335     0.0      33.30     13444 
DEPTSTOR  .15870       .25209     0.0      12.50     13444 
EATDRINK  6.6657       3.9570     0.0      100.0     13444 
FURN      1.8646       2.5164     0.0      100.0     13444 
GAS       1.7654       1.7958     0.0      100.0     13444 
 
1Income, Addlinc, Incper,and Medinc are in $10,000 units and are censored at 
10. 
2Population growth is growth/population. 
 
4.1.  The Choice Based Sampling Problem 
 The incidence of default among our sample of cardholders mimics reasonably closely the 
incidence of default among cardholders in the population.  But, the proportion of cardholders in the 
sample is, by design, considerably larger than the proportion of applications that are accepted.  That 
is, the rejection rate for applications in the population is much higher than our sample suggests.  The 
sampling is said to be `choice based' if the proportional representation of certain outcomes of the 
dependent variable in the model is deliberately different from the proportional representation of 
those outcomes in the population from which the sample is drawn.  In our sample, 10499 of 13444 
observations are cardholders, a proportion of .78094.  But, in the population, the proportion of card 
applications which are accepted is closer to 23.2%.  In view of the fact that we are using 
`Cardholder' as a selection rule for the default equation, the sample is `choice based.'  This is a type 
of nonrandom sampling that has been widely documented in other contexts, and has been modelled 
in a counterpart to the study by Boyes, et. al. (1989). 
 Choice based sampling induces a bias in the estimation of discrete choice models.  As has 
been shown by Manski and Lerman (1977) possible to mitigate the induced bias if one knows the 
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true proportions that should apply in the sampling.  These are listed in Table 3 
 
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ 
│  Table 3.  Sampling Weights for Choice Based Sampling       │ 
│  ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────    │ 
│  Event          w=sample         W=Population      Ω=W/w    │ 
│  ──────────   ───────────        ────────────    ───────    │ 
│  D=1, C=1       996/13444         .232 × .103     .32255    │ 
│  D=0, C=1      9503/13444         .232 × .897     .29441    │ 
│       C=0      2945/13444         .768           3.50594    │ 
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
 
The `Weighted Endogenous Sampling MLE' or `WESML' estimator is obtained by maximizing    
where the subscript `i' indicates the ith individual.  There are J possible outcomes, indexed by `j,' the 
indicator Iij equals 1 if outcome or choice j is occurs for or is chosen by individual i,  Pij is the 
theoretical probability that individual i makes choice j, Ωj is the sampling weight, 
  Ωj      =  Wj/wj  (4.2) 
and  Wj =  the 'true' or population proportion of occurrences of outcome j
 (4.3)
 
  wj =  the sample counterpart to Wj. 
(See Table 3.)  Note that in our application, this would give smaller weight to cardholders in the 
sample and larger weight to rejects than would the unweighted log-likelihood. 
 After estimation, an adjustment must be made to the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix 
of the estimates in order to account for the weighting.  The appropriate asymptotic covariance matrix 
is
 V  =  H-1BH-1, (4.4) 
where   B  =  the Berndt et. al. (1974) estimator  
   H  =  inverse of the estimated expected Hessian of the log-likelihood.  Both 
matrices in the expression are computed using the sampling weights given above. 
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1.  Cardholder Status 
 Table 4 presents univariate probit estimates of the cardholder equation both with and without 
the correction for choice based sampling.  We also show the results of applying the familiar 
prediction rule.  The effect of the reweighting is quite clear in these tables.  As might be expected, 
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with the choice based sampling correction, the predictions are more in line with the population 
proportions than with the distorted sample. 
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ 
│  Table 4.  Weighted and Unweighted Probit Cardholder Equations  │ 
│                                                                 │ 
│    ────────┬───────────────────────┬───────────────────────┐    │ 
│            │ Choice based sampling │       Unweighted      │    │ 
│    ────────┼───────────────────────┼───────────────────────┤    │ 
│    Variable│ Coefficient  t-ratio  │  Coefficient   t-ratio│    │ 
│    ────────┴───────────────────────┴───────────────────────┘    │ 
│    ONE        -1.1175      -9.090       0.1070        1.390     │ 
│    AGE        -0.0021      -0.806      -0.0012       -0.672     │ 
│    MTHCURAD    0.0010       2.547       0.0011        3.943     │ 
│    DEPNDNTS   -0.0947      -2.623      -0.0957       -4.079     │ 
│    MTHMPLOY   -0.0002      -0.410      -0.0002       -0.694     │ 
│    MAJORDRG   -0.7514     -13.922      -0.7796      -34.777     │ 
│    MINORDRG   -0.0609      -1.554      -0.0471       -2.005     │ 
│    OWNRENT     0.0514       0.947      -0.0042       -0.119     │ 
│    MTHPRVAD    0.0002       0.626       0.0001        0.767     │ 
│    PREVIOUS    0.1781       1.843       0.2089        2.967     │ 
│    INCOME      0.1153       4.353       0.1362        7.001     │ 
│    SELFEMPL   -0.3652      -3.711      -0.3634       -5.804     │ 
│    TRADACCT    0.0995      19.447       0.1099       25.573     │ 
│    INCPER     -0.0167      -0.476      -0.0007       -0.027     │ 
│    CREDOPEN   -0.0276      -3.550      -0.0227       -4.194     │ 
│    CREDACTV    0.0443       2.825       0.0341        3.074     │ 
│    CRDDEL30   -0.2720      -2.658      -0.2740       -4.776     │ 
│    CR30DLNQ   -0.0947      -3.773      -0.0891       -6.732     │ 
│    AVGRVBAL    0.0095       2.949       0.0094        3.560     │ 
│    AVBALINC   -0.0019      -1.616      -0.0010       -2.573     │ 
│    BANKSAV    -0.5018      -4.012      -0.5233       -7.305     │ 
│    BANKBOTH    0.4630       9.579       0.4751       14.692     │ 
│    CRDBRINQ   -0.1559     -13.907      -0.1719      -23.469     │ 
│    CREDMAJR    0.3033       5.407       0.3092        8.652     │ 
│                                                                 │ 
│              Predicted                    Predicted             │ 
│    Actual     0     1   TOTAL   Actual     0      1   TOTAL     │ 
│    0       .208  .011    2945   0       .110   .109    2945     │ 
│    1       .420  .361   10499   1       .020   .761   10499     │ 
│    TOTAL   8448  4996   13444   TOTAL   1748  11696   13444     │ 
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
 
 The cardholder equation is largely consistent with expectations.  The most significant 
explanatory variables are the number of major derogatory reports and credit bureau inquiries 
(negative) and the number of open trade accounts (positive).  What Table 7 reveals most clearly is 
the credit scoring vendor's very heavy reliance upon credit reporting agencies such as TRW.  There 
is one surprising result.  Conventional wisdom in this setting is that the own/rent indicator for home 
ownership is the single most powerful predictor of whether an applicant will be given a credit card.  
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We find no evidence of this in these data.  Rather, as one might expect, what explains acceptance 
best is a higher income, fewer dependents, and a `clean' credit file with numerous accounts at the 
reporting agency.  Surprisingly, being employed longer at one's current job appears not to increase 
the probability of approval, though being self employed appears significantly to decrease it.  We 
should note, the market descriptive data are interesting for revealing patterns in the default data.  
But, because they do not relate specifically to the individual, they could not be used in a commercial 
credit scoring model. 
5.2.  Expenditure 
 The expenditure equation is estimated using Heckman's sample selection correction and 
adjustment for the estimated standard errors of the coefficients.  The selection mechanism is the 
univariate probit model for cardholder status.  The equations of the model are given in (3.4) to (3.7). 
 Details on the estimation method may be found in Heckman (1979) and Greene (1981, 1993).   
Parameter estimates and estimated asymptotic standard errors are given in Table 5.  Note that the 
dependent variable in this equation is average monthly expenditure, computed as the simple average 
of the 12 months beginning with when the credit card was issued. 
 
 As might be expected, INCOME is the single most significant explanatory variable in the 
expenditure equation.  The market variables which appear to be very significant are puzzling.  Three, 
PCTOWN, PCTBLACK, and PCTSPAN, given their relationship to average income, would seem to 
have the wrong sign.  But, since MEDINC is already in the equation, as well as the individual 
income, one must conclude that these variables are picking up some other effect. 
 The last variable in the equation is the selectivity correction described earlier.  Its large t-
statistic suggests that the sample selection correction is, indeed, warranted.  The coefficient on 
LAMBDA estimates -ρuwσu.  An estimate of σu is given at the top of the results, 319.68, so the 
implied estimate of ρuw is -.204.  The negative value is surprising given the criteria that are probably 
used to determine cardholder status.  But, since, INCOME, OWNRENT, etc. are already in the 
equation, it is unclear just what sign should have been expected. 
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 Table 6 displays the average predicted expenditures for three groups of observations.  The 
predicted expenditure is substantially higher for those whose applications were denied. 
5.3.  Default Probability 
 Table 7 gives the probit estimates of the default equation.  Predicted expenditure, FITEXP, is 
computed using (3.7).  The `selection' variable, λi, is computed using the leftmost coefficients in 
Table 4.  The coefficients used in computing the linear function in (3.7) are given in Table 5.  The 
single equation, unconditional model is given in the first three columns. The results agree with our 
conjecture that default rates might be related to expenditures, the idea of cardholders "getting in over 
their heads" comes to mind.  Table 8 presents the full information, conditional estimates of the 
default equation based on (2.8) to (2.11) and (4.2) to (4.4) with the reestimated cardholder equation.  
Estimates of the cardholder equation are given in Table 8. 
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┌────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ 
│ Table 5.  Estimated Expenditure Equation       │ 
│ ─────────────────────────────────────────────  │ 
│ Dependent Variable   =  AVGEXP in $ per month  │ 
│ Observations         =    10499                │ 
│ Mean of LHS          =   251.03                │ 
│ StdDev of residuals  =   315.60                │ 
│ Corrected Std. error =   319.68                │ 
│ (This is a consistent estimate of σu)          │ 
│ R-squared            =     0.0977              │ 
│ Adjusted R-squared   =     0.0952              │ 
│ Correlation of disturbance in regression and   │ 
│ selection equation   =  -0.204                 │ 
│                                                │ 
│ Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error   t-ratio    │ 
│ ───────────────────────────────────────────    │ 
│ Constant   -44.249      160.270      -0.276    │ 
│ AGE         -1.487        0.34655    -4.291    │ 
│ DEPNDNTS    -2.0829       2.79774    -0.744    │ 
│ OWNRENT     -1.9733       7.71648    -0.256    │ 
│ INCOME      55.0379       2.05561    26.774    │ 
│ SELFEMPL   -33.4684      14.3173     -2.338    │ 
│ TRADACCT     1.5301       0.63709     2.402    │ 
│ PROF        71.8808     157.985       0.455    │ 
│ MGT         60.3144     158.096       0.382    │ 
│ MILITARY     9.0472     159.241       0.057    │ 
│ CLERICAL    25.8032     158.121       0.163    │ 
│ SALES      112.145      158.118       0.709    │ 
│ OTHERJOB    53.4139     157.770       0.339    │ 
│ BUYPOWER   375.513      380.930       0.986    │ 
│ PCTCOLL      1.7967       0.46231     3.886    │ 
│ MEDAGE      -0.0889       0.61771    -0.144    │ 
│ MEDINC      14.3057       3.95810     3.614    │ 
│ PCTOWN      -0.5333       0.13336    -3.999    │ 
│ PCTBLACK     0.5094       0.17949     2.838    │ 
│ PCTSPAN      0.6271       0.25991     2.413    │ 
│ GROWTH       0.00564      0.015846    0.356    │ 
│ PCTEMPL     -0.01769      0.033207   -0.533    │ 
│ APPAREL      0.78475      1.49578     0.525    │ 
│ AUTO        -4.89992      2.56277     1.912    │ 
│ BUILDMTL     1.48865      2.63996     0.564    │ 
│ DEPTSTOR    -6.61155     13.9866     -0.473    │ 
│ EATDRINK    -1.24421      0.82499    -1.508    │ 
│ FURN         0.97996      1.15843     0.846    │ 
│ GAS         -1.77288      1.99177    -0.890    │ 
│ LAMBDA      65.4875       8.52960     7.678    │ 
└────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
 
 
 
 
 ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐ 
│  Table 6.  Average Predicted Expenditures   │ 
│  ─────────────────────────────────────────  │ 
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│    All Observations          $263.29        │ 
│    Cardholders               $251.03        │ 
│    Noncardholders            $307.03        │ 
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
 
 
 
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ 
│ Table 7.  Default Model                                                │ 
│ ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── │ 
│                 Unconditional               Conditional                │ 
│           ────────────────────────    ──────────────────────────────── │ 
│ Variable  Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio    Coeff.  Std.Err. t-ratio Partial │ 
│ Basic Default Specification                                            │ 
│ Constant -1.1350   0.0984  -11.533 │ -1.3752   0.3945  -3.486  ──────  │ 
│ AGE      -0.0031   0.0023   -1.342 │ -0.0054   0.0094  -0.582  -.0018  │ 
│ MTHCURAD  0.0003   0.0003    1.069 │  0.0002   0.0013   0.153  -.0001  │ 
│ DEPNDNTS  0.0445   0.0294    1.512 │ -0.0217   0.1114  -0.195   .0073  │ 
│ MTHMPLOY  0.0007   0.0003    2.331 │  0.0007   0.0013   0.566   .0002  │ 
│ MAJORDRG  0.0592   0.0408    1.448 │ -0.2969   0.1985  -1.495   .0033  │ 
│ MINORDRG  0.0764   0.0296    2.586 │  0.1780   0.0993   1.793   .0488  │ 
│ OWNRENT  -0.0010   0.4312   -0.023 │  0.0908   0.1706   0.533   .0236  │ 
│ MTHPRVAD  0.0004   0.0002    1.817 │  0.0002   0.0009   0.274   .00002 │ 
│ PREVIOUS -0.1507   0.0792   -1.902 │ -0.1112   0.3103  -0.358  -.0434  │ 
│ INCOME   -0.0168   0.0033   -5.608 │ -0.0072   0.0151  -0.476   .0062  │ 
│ SELFEMPL  0.0788   0.0850    0.927 │ -0.1969   0.3565  -0.552   -0017  │ 
│ TRADACCT  0.0004   0.0044    0.109 │  0.0207   0.0205   1.009  -.0028  │ 
│ INCPER   -0.0228   0.0323   -0.706 │ -0.0545   0.1058  -0.515  -.0094  │ 
│ EXP_INC  -0.4761   0.1717   -2.774 │ -0.5790   0.5033  -1.150  -.1614  │ 
│ Credit Bureau                      │                                   │ 
│ CREDOPEN  0.0138   0.0063    2.195 │  0.0199   0.0272   0.732   .0066  │ 
│ CREDACTV -0.1218   0.0126   -9.657 │ -0.1500   0.0557  -2.695  -.0424  │ 
│ CRDDEL30  0.2841   0.0712    3.991 │  0.2829   0.2766   1.023   .1120  │ 
│ CR30DLNQ  0.0806   0.0177    4.559 │  0.0446   0.0757   0.589   .0225  │ 
│ AVGRVBAL  0.0011   0.0024    0.439 │  0.0156   0.0123   1.268   .0038  │ 
│ AVBALINC  0.0039   0.00042   9.192 │  0.0008   0.0021   0.398   .0004  │ 
│ Expenditure                        │                                   │ 
│ FITEXP    0.0014   0.0044    3.103 │  0.00064  0.0019   0.336          │ 
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐ 
│ Table 8. Estimated Cardholder Equation  │ 
│           Joint with Default Equation   │ 
│ ──────────────────────────────────────  │ 
│           Coeff.  Std Error t-ratio     │ 
│ Basic Cardholder Specification          │ 
│ Constant -1.2734   0.1563   -8.150      │ 
│ AGE      -0.00002  0.0039   -0.006      │ 
│ MTHCURAD  0.0015   0.0006    2.465      │ 
│ DEPNDNTS -0.1314   0.0487   -2.700      │ 
│ MTHMPLOY  0.0003   0.0006    0.491      │ 
│ MAJORDRG -0.8230   0.0442  -18.634      │ 
│ MINORDRG  0.0082   0.0462    0.178      │ 
│ OWNRENT   0.0129   0.0765    0.168      │ 
│ MTHPRVAD  0.0003   0.0004    0.698      │ 
│ PREVIOUS  0.1185   0.1283    0.924      │ 
│ INCOME    0.0156   0.0040    3.867      │ 
│ SELFEMPL -0.5651   0.1307   -4.325      │ 
│ TRADACCT  0.0850   0.0064   13.352      │ 
│ INCPER   -0.0550   0.0513   -1.073      │ 
│ Credit Bureau                           │ 
│ CREDOPEN -0.0096   0.0109   -0.876      │ 
│ CREDACTV  0.0060   0.0223    0.270      │ 
│ CRDDEL30 -0.3167   0.1197   -2.647      │ 
│ CR30DLNQ -0.0965   0.0317   -3.048      │ 
│ AVGRVBAL  0.0049   0.0050    0.974      │ 
│ AVBALINC -0.0014   0.0008   -1.906      │ 
│ Credit Reference                        │ 
│ BANKSAV  -0.4708   0.1731   -2.719      │ 
│ BANKBOTH  0.5074   0.0694    7.310      │ 
│ CRDBRINQ -0.1473   0.0176   -8.393      │ 
│ CREDMAJR  0.3663   0.0807    4.541      │ 
│ Correlation Between Disturbances        │ 
│ ρwε       0.4478   0.2580    1.736      │ 
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
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 Maximum likelihood estimates for the conditional model are obtained by maximizing 
 
 log-L = ΣC=0 Ωilog(Prob[Ci=0]) + ΣC=1,D=0 Ωilog(Prob[Di=0│Ci=1]Prob[Ci=1]) 
 
          + ΣC=1,D=1 Ωilog(Prob[Di=1│Ci=1]Prob[Ci=1]) 
 
        = ΣC=0 Ωilog(1-Φ(γ′vi)) + ΣC=1,D=0 ΩilogΦ2[-(β′xi+δS
_
i),γ′vi,-ρ] 
 
          + ΣC=1,D=1 ΩilogΦ2(β′xi+δS
_
i,γ′vi,ρ).17
 
Optimization and construction of the asymptotic covariance matrix for the estimates can be based on 
the following results:  Let Φ2(d,c,ρ) and φ2(d,c,ρ) denote the cdf and density, respectively, of the 
bivariate normal distribution.  Then, 
   ∂Φ2/∂c  =  φ(c)Φ[(d-ρc)/(1-ρ2)½]  =  gc, 
   ∂Φ2/∂ρ  =  φ2, 
   ∂2Φ2/∂c2 =  -cgc - ρφ2 - g/Φ2, 
   ∂2Φ2/∂c∂d  =  φ2 - gcgd/Φ2, (5.1) 
   ∂2Φ2/∂c∂ρ  =  φ2([ρ/(1-ρ2)½](d-ρc) - c - gc/Φ2), 
   ∂2Φ2/∂ρ2  =  φ2{[ρ/(1-ρ2)](1 - (c2+d2-2ρcd)/(1-ρ2)) + ρcd - φ2/Φ2}. 
Terms that are symmetric in c and d are omitted. 
 Partial effects in the single equation model are obtained by multiplying the coefficients by 
∂Φ(d)/∂d = φ(d), which is roughly .13 for these data.  By this calculation, the most important 
behavioral variables in the equation appear to be MAJORDRG (.0077), MINORDRG (.0099), 
CRDDEL30C (.0369), and CR30DLNQ (.0104).  These are counts, so the marginal effects are 
obtained directly.  Note, in particular, the number of trade lines past due at the time of the 
application.  An increase of one in this variable alone would be sufficient to raise the estimated 
 
     17This is the same log likelihood as maximized by Boyes, et. al. (1989).  The second term in their formulation would 
be log[Φ(d)-Φ2(d,c,ρ)], but this equals log[Φ2(-d,c,-ρ)], so the two are the same. 
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default probability from an acceptable level (say .095) to well beyond the threshold (roughly .11).  
CPTF30, the number of 30 day delinquencies, is similarly influential.  The marginal effects in the 
conditional probability, account for the selection equation.  Let the joint probability be denoted 
 
    Prob[D=1,C=1]  =  Φ2[d,c,ρ], (5.2) 
 
where    d = β′xi + δ[α′z + αλφ(γ′v)/Φ(γ′v)] (5.3) 
and     c = γ′v. 
[See (3.7) and (3.8).  Note that the term in square brackets is expected expenditure given cardholder 
status.]  Let w denote the union of the variables in x [see (2.6)], v [see (2.9)], and z [see (3.1)].  Then, 
reconfigure β, γ, and α conformably, with zeros in the locations where variables do not actually 
appear in the original equation.  Thus, 
 ∂Prob[D=1│C=1,S]    1       ∂d    ∂c       Φ2(d,c,ρ)φ(c)  ∂c 
──────────    =  ── [ gd ── + gc ──]  -  ────── ──. (5.4) 
 ∂w      Φ(c)       ∂w    ∂w  (Φ(c))2       ∂w 
 
The outer derivatives, gd and gc were defined earlier.  The inner derivatives are 
 
    ∂c/∂w  =  γ (5.5) 
and 
    ∂d/∂ω  =  β + δ[α - αλλ(c+λ)γ]. (5.6) 
 
Inserting the sample means of the variables where required for the computations gives an estimate of 
approximately +0.0033.  The rightmost column in Table 7, labelled 'Partial,' gives a complete set of 
estimates of the marginal effects for the conditional default equation.   It is clear that the coefficients, 
themselves, are misleading.  In particular, the apparent effect of MAJORDRG turns out to be an 
effect of selection; increases in this variable appear to decrease default only because increases so 
heavily (negatively) influence the approval decision. 
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5.4.  Predicted Default Probabilities 
 Table 9 shows the average of the predicted default probabilities computed with the models in 
Tables 7 and 8 for some subgroups of the data set. 
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐ 
│ Table 9.  Estimated Default Probabilities   │ 
│ ──────────────────────────────────────────  │ 
│   Group         Conditional  Unconditional  │ 
│                                             │ 
│   All observations .1498       .1187        │ 
│   Cardholders      .1056       .0947        │ 
│   Non-cardholders  .3090       .2061        │ 
│   Defaulters       .1632       .1437        │ 
│   Nondefaulters    .0997       .0895        │ 
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
 
 The standard predictive rule, `predict yi = 1 if P^i > .5' predicts only 11 defaults, 6 of them 
incorrectly, in the sample of 10,499 observations which includes 996 defaults.  Obviously, this is not 
likely to be useful.  The problem is that the sample is extremely unbalanced, with only 10 percent of 
the observations defaulting.  Since the average predicted probability in the sample will equal the 
sample proportion, it will take an extreme observation to produce a probability as high as .5.  Table 
10 shows the effect with three alternative choices of the threshold value.  The value .09487 is the 
sample proportion. 
┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ 
│  Table 10.  Predictions for Different Thresholds                  │ 
│  ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  │ 
│                 Predict D=0              Predict D=1              │ 
│            ────────────────────      ──────────────────           │ 
│            .09487    .12   .15       .09487   .12   .15           │ 
│            ────────────────────      ──────────────────           │ 
│  Actual                                                    Total  │ 
│  0          5225    6464   7675       4278   3039   1828    9503  │ 
│  1           214     329    494        782    667    502     996  │ 
│  Total      5439    6793   8169       5060   3706   2330   10499  │ 
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
 
5.5.  Expected Profit 
 The final step in this part of the analysis is to construct the equation for expected profit from 
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approving an application.  The basis of the model is equation (3.9).  We used the following specific 
formulation: 
 
  m   =  2%  +  10%/52  (merchant fee) 
  f   =  1.25%   (finance charges) 
  t =  1%   (opportunity cost of funds) 
  r   =  50%   (recovery rate) (5.7) 
  q   =  2%   (penalty rate) 
  fee =  $5.25   (fee for card(s)) 
  o =  .2%   (overhead rate on loans) 
 
This assumes a 2.00 percent merchant fee, 1.25 percent finance charge, plus one week's float on 
repayment and an interest rate of 10 percent.  The net return on finance charges is only 3% per year, 
but the merchant fees are quite substantial.  We assume a 50 percent ultimate recovery rate on 
defaulted loans and a 2 percent penalty rate. As before, we acknowledge the simplicity of the 
preceding.  Nonetheless, it captures most of the important aspects of the calculation.  Based on the 
estimated expenditure equation and conditional default model, Table 11 lists the sample averages for 
E[Π] for several subgroups. 
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐ 
│ Table 11.  Sample Average Expected Profits  │ 
│ ──────────────────────────────────────────  │ 
│                                             │ 
│ All Observations          -$4.41            │ 
│ Cardholders                $4.27            │ 
│      Defaulters           -$3.15            │ 
│      Nondefaulters         $5.06            │ 
│ Noncardholders           -$35.32            │ 
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
 
 The values in Table 11 are striking.  It is clear that the results are being driven by the default 
probability.  Figure 1 is a scatter plot of the estimated profits against the predicted default probability 
for 3,000 randomly chosen observations from the full sample. 
 
   Figure 1.  Expected Profit vs. Default Probability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33
  
 
 
 
 
The vertical line in the figure is drawn at the sample average default rate of slightly under 10 
percent.  The horizontal line is drawn at zero.  The figure clearly shows that the model predicts 
negative profits for most individuals whose estimated default probability exceeds roughly ten 
percent.  The familiar rule of 0.5 for the threshold for predicting default is obviously far too high to 
be effective in this setting. 
 
  Figure 2.  Expected Profit vs. Expected Expenditure 
 Figure 1 agrees strongly with Boyes, et. al.'s finding that applicants whose default 
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probability exceeded 9 percent were generally associated with negative profits.  We find exactly the 
same result.  But, they suggest at several points that higher balances are likely to be  associated with 
higher expected earnings.  Our results strongly suggest the opposite.  Figure 2 shows the expected 
profits plotted against expected expenditure for the same 3,000 observations used to produce Figure 
1.  Clearly, beyond a surprisingly modest expenditure level, higher expenditures are generally 
associated with lower, not higher profits.  Our own results are easily explained.  The expenditure 
level strongly influences the default probability in our model, and the profit equation is, in turn, 
heavily dependent on the default probability.  The result is explored further in the next section. 
5.6.  Aggregate Decision Rules for Approving or Denying Credit 
 Consider a pool of applicants within which default probabilities will be widely distributed.  
For each individual in the pool, we can compute an expected profit, as in the preceding section, 
which will depend on both predicted default rate and predicted expenditure.  The expected profit of a 
decision rule can then be obtained by summing the expected profits of those in the pool who are 
accepted by this rule.  An equivalent procedure is to compute the `normalized expected profit,' 
    E*[Π]  =  EP*[{E[Πi]│P
*} × AR(P*)] (5.7) 
where AR(P*) is the acceptance rate associated with a particular threshold probability.  Obviously, 
AR(P*) increases monotonically with P*.  However, E[Πi]│P* falls with P*. Because the acceptance 
rate is falling with P*, the profit that will be obtained from a given pool need not rise with falling P*.  
In short, a rule which decreases P* attracts fewer and fewer better and better loans.  Thus, the total, 
average loans times number of loans, may not rise. 
 In order to estimate the function in (5.7), we use the following steps:  Compute for every 
individual in the pool (1) probability of acceptance, Prob[Ci=1] = Φ[γ'vi], (note that this is only for 
purposes of dealing with our censoring problem; it is not part of the structure of the model) (2) 
expected expenditure from (3.7), (3) probability of default from (3.8), and (4) expected profit from 
(5.7).  For different values of P*, we compute the average value of E*[Πi] for those  individuals whose 
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estimated default probability is less than P*. We then multiply this sample mean by the acceptance 
rate.  Table 12 gives the result of this calculation.  The last column shows that by this calculation, 
there is an optimal acceptance rate.  Figures 3 and 4 show the relationship between acceptance rate 
and normalized expected profit. 
 ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ 
 │  Table 12.  Normalized Expected Profits                  │ 
 │  ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────  │ 
 │     P*         Acceptance    Sample Mean     Normalized  │ 
 │                   Rate        E*[Πi]│P*          Profit  │ 
 │   0.00000        0.00000        0.00000        0.00000  │ 
 │   0.00500        0.00885       21.89900        0.19384  │ 
 │   0.01000        0.02581       20.29800        0.52391  │ 
 │   0.02000        0.07461       17.41600        1.29933  │ 
 │   0.03000        0.13292       15.54800        2.06667  │ 
 │   0.04000        0.19154       14.19900        2.71961  │ 
 │   0.05000        0.25082       13.12700        3.29249  │ 
 │   0.06000        0.30861       12.22200        3.77187  │ 
 │   0.07000        0.36180       11.45900        4.14583  │ 
 │   0.08000        0.40970       10.79700        4.42353  │ 
 │   0.09000        0.45425       10.19100        4.62931  │ 
 │   0.10000        0.49636        9.62100        4.77543  │ 
 │   0.11000        0.53689        9.07600        4.87285  │ 
 │   0.11500        0.55437        8.83700        4.89900  │ 
 │   0.12000        0.57200        8.59900        4.91865  │ 
 │   0.12500        0.58710        8.38800        4.92460  │ 
 │   0.13000        0.60257        8.17170        4.92405  │ 
 │   0.13500        0.61871        7.94200        4.91383  │ 
 │   0.14000        0.63262        7.74310        4.89850  │ 
 │   0.15000        0.66096        7.32700        4.84288  │ 
 │   0.16000        0.68826        6.91500        4.75933  │ 
 │   0.17000        0.71259        6.52260        4.64791  │ 
 │   0.18000        0.73408        6.18000        4.53663  │ 
 │   0.19000        0.75268        5.85800        4.40919  │ 
 │   0.20000        0.76986        5.42200        4.17418  │ 
 └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
 
 
Table 12 suggests that a rule P* = .125, or an acceptance rate of about 59% is optimal.  This is a rule 
that allows a fairly high default rate, in exchange for higher expected profits.  It also accepts some 
individuals with negative expected profits, since the default rate is not, alone, sufficient to insure 
positive expected profit.  This acceptance rate is noticeably higher than the value actually observed, 
which was roughly 25 percent during the period in which these data were drawn. 
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5.7.  Ranking Attributes Which Contribute to a Denial of Credit 
 Denote by R* the criterion, or `rule' that has been used for the decision whether to approve or 
deny an application and by R(wi) the value of the criterion for a particular individual `i,' where w is 
the full vector of attributes and characteristics used in the calculation.  In order to establish which 
factor contributed to an individual's failure to meet the benchmark, we need to determine the values 
of the factors which are consistent with meeting it. We can do so by sampling individuals which 
meet the benchmark and empirically determining sample means.  We will do so by obtaining for a 
set of individuals, all of whom are at or close to the benchmark, the sample means of the attributes.  
This estimates E[w│P=P*]. Denote the set of sample means w
_
 *.  If the sample is large enough (by 
which we would surmise a few thousand observations), then it will be the case that R* ≈ R(w_ *).  
Now, approximate the rule function evaluated at the particular wi with a linear Taylor series, 
expanding around the point of means that we have obtained; 
   R(wi) - R*  ≈  Σk [∂R(w
_
 *)/∂w_ ](wik - w_ ) 
                   =  Σkψk(wik - w
_ ). 
Thus, the deviation of the individual's `score' from the benchmark is expressed as a linear function of 
the deviations of their attributes from the benchmark attributes.  If the decision rule is the default 
probability, then the elements of ψ are the marginal effects in (5.3).  Some of the numeric values are 
given in the last column of Table 7.  If the expected profit is used, the calculation is only slightly 
more difficult.  By combining terms, the expected profit may be written as  
   E[Π] = π0  +  E[S](π1 + Prob[D=1│C=1]), 
so the extension to this function would be straightforward using results already given. 
 We will use the default probability for an illustration.  For the example, we take as a cutoff 
our earlier described optimal default probability rule of R* = P* = .125.  Using the model presented in 
the previous sections, observation number 4805 in our sample has a predicted default probability of 
.165, so they would be rejected. (They were.)  In order to obtain the means for the calculation, we 
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use observations which have predicted default rates between .115 and .135.  (With more data we 
could use a narrower range.)  This leaves about 800 observations from the original 13,444.  The set 
of calculations listed above produces a default probability at the means of roughly R(w
_
 *) = .116.  The 
sample mean predicted default probability for these 800 observations is R
_
 = .127.  (Recall, we have 
attempted to match .125, so this is quite close.)  The difference between the computed default 
probability and the benchmark is .165-.125 = 0.040.  The decomposition obtained as the sum of the 
terms gives a value of .0414.  The difference of -.0014 would be the remainder term in the Taylor 
series approximation.  The largest single term is associated with CPTF30, the 30 day delinquency 
count in the last 12 months. The average in the sample for this variable is .242.  This individual had 
4.  The second largest contributor was the number of credit bureau inquiries, for which, once again, 
this individual (4) was well above the mean (1.2358). 
6.  Conclusions 
 The preceding has described a methodology for incorporating costs and expected profits into 
a credit scoring model for loan approvals.  Our main conclusion is the same as Boyes, et. al.'s 
(1989).  When expected return is included in the credit scoring rule, the lender will approve 
applications that would otherwise be rejected by a rule that focuses solely on default probability.  
Contrary to what intuition might suggest, we find that when spending levels are included as a 
component of the default probability, which seems quite plausible, the optimal loan size is relatively 
small. 
 The model used for profit in this study is rudimentary.  More detailed data on payment 
schedules would allow a more elaborate behavioral model of the consumer's repayment decisions.  
Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to expect similar patterns to emerge in more detailed studies.  
Since, in spite of our earlier discussion, we continue to find that default probability is a crucial 
determinant of the results, it seems that the greatest payoff in terms of model development would be 
found here.  For example, with better and finer data, it would be possible to examine the timing of 
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default, rather than simply its occurrence.  The relationship between default probability and account 
size could also be further refined.  Finally, our objective function for the lender, expected profit, is 
quite simple.  The preceding is best viewed as merely a simulation.  A more elaborate model which 
makes use of the variation in expenditures from month to month or used the second moment of the 
distribution of profits might more reasonably characterize the lender's objectives. 
 Much of the modelling done here is purely illustrative.  The equations are somewhat 
unwieldy.  Credit scoring vendors would still be required to manipulate the models with 
convenience, which would make a more critical specification search necessary.  The obvious use of 
models such as ours is for processing initial applications, which can, in principle, be done at a 
leisurely pace.  But, an equally common application is the in store approval for large purchases.  For 
relatively small purchases this has been automated, and focuses simply on whether the account is 
already in arrears.  But, for very large purchases which often require human intervention, credit card 
companies often rely on a decidedly ad hoc procedure, the gut reaction of an individual based on a 
short telephone call.  A simple enough behavioral model which incorporates up to date information 
and behavioral characteristics might be of use in this situation. 
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